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Abstract 
The idea of a ‘Right to Buy’ for council-house tenants originated after 1945 as part of the Conservative attempt to build 
a ‘property-owning democracy’, however it was deemed inappropriate and of doubtful political value by Party elites until 
Conservative councils enacted profitable local sales schemes during the late-1960s. This article argues that the success of 
the ‘Right to Buy’ was contingent on the changing socio-economic context of the post-war decades, and determined by the 
specific nature of the British housing market. The expansion of working-class owner-occupation, and changes to the 
public and private rental sectors, created the conditions in which the ‘Right to Buy’ idea was liberated from its immediate 
post-war constraints. The article provides evidence of the deeper origins of ‘Thatcherite’ policies within the post-war 
Conservative Party, and suggests that the post-war ‘consensus’ was a soft set of political parameters which were easily 
discarded once new political possibilities arose out of a changing electorate. 
Key words: Housing; Property-owning democracy; Thatcherism; Conservatism; Consensus. 
 
 
The ‘Right to Buy’ scheme, enacted in October 1980 by Margaret Thatcher’s first Conservative 
government, was at the core of the political project of ‘Thatcherism.’ The policy, which gave all 
tenants of local authority houses a statutory right to purchase the home in which they lived at 
discounted rates (as much as 50 per cent for those who had been resident for 20 years or more), was 
hugely successful in terms of sales made. By 1996, 30 per cent of tenants had exercised their newly 
assigned right, and 2.2 million dwellings had been transferred into private ownership.1 Critics and 
supporters of the policy have both acknowledged its radicalism and significant long-term impact. 
Supporters cheer its success in providing the opportunity of home ownership to millions of council-
tenants; yet opponents argue that the policy has resulted in a chronic shortage of affordable housing, 
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 increased the burden of household debt, and cemented council-housing as a residual form of tenure 
for the poorest members of society.2 
 
In popular discourse the ‘Right to Buy’ is widely viewed as the distinct product of Margaret Thatcher’s 
personal and political ideals. Though it has been long-established in academic assessments of 
Thatcher’s career that her personal commitment to offering large discounts was muted prior to 1979, 
the association between herself and the policy remains an enduring semi-myth which continues to 
underpin her political legacy.3 The following article attempts to look beyond this narrow association, 
and beyond the decade immediately preceding the Conservative election victory in 1979, in an attempt 
to identify the actual origins of the ‘Right to Buy’ idea within the post-war Conservative Party. In 
doing so it argues that the idea of a mass sale of council houses which might circumvent the 
limitations of central and local government had its origin in Tory opposition to Labour’s public-
ownership principle immediately after 1945. Yet while a coherent Conservative commitment to 
private property-ownership appeared to justify privatization, an activist sales agenda promoted by a 
small group on the fringes of the Party was constrained as a possible policy option by the accepted 
boundaries of local-authority housing provision which were bolstered by an apparent unwillingness of 
council tenants to buy. It was not until the late 1960s, when campaigning Conservative local councils 
undertook successful sales schemes, that Party elites reconceived the idea as an attractive and tenable 
policy option. This shift was rooted in the secular trend of increased post-war working-class home-
ownership, and catalyzed by contemporary changes in the nature of council-house provision by the 
late 1960s. The principle of a right to buy was established as Party policy as early as 1974, only to be 
catalyzed further in the drive for cuts in public expenditure precipitated by the economic turmoil 
which characterised the middle of the decade.  
 
This story of the development of ‘Right to Buy’ contributes to the twin historical debates regarding 
the origins of ‘Thatcherism’ and the purported existence of a post-war ‘consensus’ in British politics. 
Historians have been concerned to ascertain the extent to which ‘Thatcherism’ was a continuation of, 
or break away from, prior traditions of British Conservatism.4 Thatcher’s contemporary critics from 
within the Conservative Party alleged that her dogmatic and divisive policies were a distinct break 
with Tory values, and Thatcher herself explicitly rejected the consensual and apparently semi-
socialistic tendencies of post-war Conservatism.5 Yet historians have increasingly recognized the clear 
ideological relationship between ‘Thatcherism’ and Tories who had always rejected the post-war 
settlement on the fringes of the Parliamentary party and in its ‘grassroots.’6 It is also clear that there 
were strong continuities between Thatcher and her consensual predecessors – especially regarding 
 property ownership.7 The argument presented in this article supports E.H.H. Green’s assertion of the 
importance of situating ‘Thatcherism’ in the historical context of the ‘long-standing arguments and 
trends in the Conservative Party’s subculture since 1945’, and demonstrates as an example that the 
‘Right to Buy’ policy had a long period of gestation in the Conservative Party.8  
 
In a related way historians have debated the extent to which a ‘consensus’ – a broad agreement on the 
economic and social agenda of politics – characterized the decades between the end of the war and 
Thatcher’s election. It has long been agreed that a ‘strong’ definition of cross-party ideological 
consensus was a mythical by-product of Thatcherite political narrative.9 Yet consensus as a framework 
for what is and isn’t politically feasible is surely a characteristic of any period of time. This article lends 
credence to the notion of a post-war ‘consensus’ defined by Kavanagh and Morris as ‘a set of 
parameters which bounded the set of policy options regarded … as administratively practicable, 
economically affordable and politically acceptable.’10 As such it was not a fixed, rigid institution but 
the product of contextual pressures. While the ideological attachment to building a ‘property-owning 
democracy’ established a commitment within the Conservative Party to reduce the number of council 
properties, radical proposals for achieving this end were constrained by what was deemed possible or 
worthwhile. It was not until the economic and social foundations which formed these constraints 
began to be eroded that the idea of a mass privatization was liberated and able to gain greater salience 
as a feasible policy. The eventual adoption of the idea in the 1970s was a function of structural 
changes and contingencies which reordered the environment in which the Conservative Party, 
pursuing a set of fairly fixed goals, was able to operate. 
 
I 
Before addressing the specific issue of the Conservative Party’s attitude to the sale of council houses, 
it is necessary to outline the nature of the Party’s overall approach to the provision of housing during 
the post-war decades. Widespread urban destruction and the inability to build new homes during 
wartime, combined with the already existing pre-war problems of chronic shortage and slum-living, 
ensured that housing was one of the most pressing social concerns for political parties after 1945.11 
The response of the Attlee-led Labour Government was to undertake a national programme of public 
construction which significantly expanded the provision of municipalized council-housing. Under the 
direction of Aneurin Bevan at the Ministry of Health, this new council-housing was intended to 
provide high-quality homes which met the general needs of the entire population.12 Meanwhile, the 
operation of the free-market in construction and private-rental was significantly curbed, with rent 
controls extended and the future development values of all undeveloped land nationalized.13 Harriet 
 Jones and Peter Weiler have both demonstrated that Labour’s attempted socialization of housing 
during the 1940s served to reaffirm the Tory commitment to a free-market in housing. Jones has 
noted that the Party, spurred-on by its Parliamentary right-wing, attempted to undertake a massive 
house-building project by freeing private enterprise from Labour controls after 1951.14 While this 
embodied the party’s faith in the efficiency of markets, it was also embedded in a broader ideological 
commitment to widening the ownership of private property. In 1946 Anthony Eden had sought to 
construct a Conservative alternative to the public ownership principle espoused by the post-war 
Attlee government which built upon Noel Skelton’s concept of the ‘property-owning democracy.’15 
This was an alternative in which ‘the ownership of property [was] not a crime or a sin, but a reward, a 
right and a responsibility that must be shared as equitably as possible.’16 In 1953 the Conservative 
Research Department (CRD) produced a policy document entitled ‘The Ownership of Property.’17 
Written by Michael Fraser, who was to later become director of the CRD (1959-64) and deputy-Chair 
of the Party (1964-75), it gave a detailed and principled account of the Conservative commitment to 
private property. Tracing the property principle ‘back through Disraeli, Coleridge and Burke, through 
the ideals of feudalism and the teachings of the early Christian church’ to Aristotle’s defense of 
private ownership against ‘Plato’s quasi-communism’, the document placed the property principle in a 
self-conscious intellectual lineage. The Conservative defense of private property was reasoned in 
terms of ‘instinct, prescription, experience, and commonsense,’ but rationalized according to a host of 
intended outcomes. Property was understood as the ‘historical basis of liberty and status’ providing 
the ‘philosophical basis for personal independence.’ Private possessions were understood as an 
‘educative and stabilizing force’, with property-owners more willing to ‘preserve moral values.’ 
Furthermore, property served as a ‘useful economic incentive.’ These philosophical ideals, according 
to Fraser, determined that the Conservative Party should ‘seek to diffuse power and property through 
the greatest practicable spread of ownership’ being ‘just as concerned to spread responsibility as to 
spread wealth.’ As core ideological principles they were actively tied to a desire to significantly expand 
home-ownership, in which mass owner-occupation would become enmeshed within a democratic 
ideal of providing the electorate with ‘a real stake in the country.’ Home ownership was believed to be 
the cornerstone of a stable, democratic society of liberated individuals.18 
 
The ideals of widely-held private property were ingrained within the Party’s grassroots discourse on 
housing.  The normative assertion that property-ownership was in some way a ‘natural’ and organic 
desire of all individuals, permeated the Party. A 1948 Conservative Political Centre (CPC) report 
condensed the discussions of nation-wide meetings of over one thousand Party members who had 
been consulted on their thoughts and attitudes regarding the concept of a ‘property-owning 
 democracy.’ In sum, these groups expressed the view that property was ‘the foundation of personal 
independence’ for which the desire to own was ‘just as natural to the human being as is the desire for 
marriage and for a family.’19 Furthermore, widespread owner-occupation was an effective political tool 
that could act as ‘an effective answer to Communism’ – or Labour socialism.20  
 
The Tory attitude to council-housing was fundamentally shaped by the Party’s commitment to owner-
occupation, alongside its desire to revive the UK private rental market.21 According to the principle of 
property-ownership, council-housing fundamentally restricted individual liberty and self-
determination. It was feared that the uncontrolled spread of council-housing would crowd-out the 
private market and create a situation in which all property was owned by the State. Weiler has noted 
the Tory efforts to counter this trend between 1951 – 1964, primarily through attempts to abolish the 
‘uneconomic’ rents of subsidized council tenancies which discouraged house purchase and private 
rental, as well as promoting a sizeable programme of private house-building.22 However, despite this 
preference for the private-sector in housing, the Party did accept that council provision served a 
specific social role in providing a residual form of tenure for households unable to pay ‘economic’ 
rents. 23 This acknowledgement that the State had a responsibility to provide for the poorest and most 
vulnerable members of society was a rejection of the ‘Bevanite’ ideal of public housing designed to 
meet ‘general needs.’24 
 
The Conservative housing record after 1951 was paradoxical. While attempts to expand owner-
occupation were highly successful (the stock of owner-occupied dwellings increased from 29 per cent 
in 1950 of the whole to 42 per cent in 1960), the Party also oversaw a continued substantial increase 
in the number of dwellings built and managed by local authorities (the stock of public housing 
increased from 18 per cent to 27 per cent between 1950 and 1960).25 Whilst removing many of the 
controls on construction and development, as well repealing most rent controls, Jones has 
demonstrated that the promise to build 300,000 houses a year through the entrepreneurial energies of 
the private market failed during the early 1950s, with the shortfall having to be met through local 
authority construction.26 Furthermore, Weiler notes that the attempt to reinstate the operation of the 
private market faced significant opposition as land speculation and ‘shark’-landlordism appeared 
socially irresponsible and morally questionable against the backdrop of ongoing shortages.27 These 
examples of the Tory failure to halt the expansion of council-housing demonstrate the constraints 
imposed by environmental and institutional factors (e.g. housing shortages, problems in the 
construction industry, municipal autonomy) which limited the Party’s capacity to totally impose its 
ideological will during its period of mid-century political dominance.  
 II 
Under Section 79 of the 1936 Housing Act local councils were permitted to sell houses (at the best 
possible price) with the consent of the Minister of Health.28 This semi-permissive legislation was 
clearly not formulated as part of any significant drive to privatize the 1.1 million council houses which 
had been constructed by 1938.29 However, the structure of this semi-permissive policy was the basic 
legal architecture through which further ideas about sales were to evolve and develop after 1945. 
Under the Attlee-led Labour government the ministerial consent was entrusted to Aneurin Bevan, 
who continually refused the sale of all local authority housing on the grounds that so long as a high 
demand for rented accommodation continued it would be wrong for councils to remove properties 
from the available housing stock.30 Bevan’s commitment was to the provision of housing to meet 
‘general needs’, and he argued that houses financed by the public should not ‘be sold to others merely 
because they have the money to buy them.’31 For many Conservatives, hoping to limit the growth of 
the State in the housing market and to extend private property-ownership, Bevan’s obstinacy was 
deeply frustrating. The most significant critic of Labour’s restrictions on council house sales during 
the 1940s was David Gammans, MP for the north London constituency of Hornsey. Gammans, who 
was to serve as Assistant Postmaster General in Winston Churchill’s 1951 government, was the chief 
protagonist during the late 1940s in promoting a sales policy. A February 1947 meeting of the party’s 
Housing, Local Government, and Works Committee (HLGW) discussed Gammans’s proposal to 
‘[empower]… local authorities to dispose of the freehold of council houses’ as a means of ‘breaking 
up the ownership of large estates’, and in December he directly challenged the Minister of Health in 
the Commons over his refusal to grant Hornsey Borough Council the right to sell properties.32 A few 
weeks later he wrote to Churchill arguing for the benefits of a major council house sales policy. 
Referring to a recent vote at the Party’s Brighton conference in which the idea of council house sales 
was ‘adopted unanimously in principle’, he stressed that it was an issue upon which the Party could 
win ‘many thousands of votes’ which were ‘likely to remain Conservative’ – given an ‘intensive 
propaganda’ effort. Beyond the apparent electoral advantage, Gammans framed the issue of council 
house sales within the broader ideological conflict between the two main parties, criticizing Bevan for 
‘turning the British people into a race of propertyless proletarians’ – when ‘nine people out of ten’ 
apparently wanted to own their own homes. In his letter, the Member for Hornsey attempted to push 
Churchill towards taking an active stance on the issue, suggesting that he might mention it in an 
upcoming public broadcast, and even arranged a ‘small luncheon party’ for Lord Woolton and a 
selection of ‘knowledgeable’ guests to discuss sales. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on 
housing policy in which Gammans posed ideas under the heading ‘The Breaking up of Council 
 Estates.’ The most significant of these proposals was that the council house tenant ‘of, say, five years 
standing’ might be given ‘the unchallengeable right to buy his own house.’ 33 
 
Almost six months passed before a frustrated Gammans received a response from the CRD which 
rejected his ‘frequently canvassed suggestion’ of awarding all council tenants with a statutory right of 
purchase. 34 In a note written by G.D.M. Block it was argued that the national government should not 
encroach on local government responsibility for public housing. While admitting that selling council 
properties could raise significant revenues, Block argued that it would be a ‘dereliction’ of the ‘proper 
duties’ of local authorities – and felt that the scheme went far beyond the intentions of the 1936 
legislation. He referred to the fact that housing was broadly viewed in the late 1940s as a public 
service ‘just as the provision of baths…or of hospital accommodation,’ and that this sales scheme 
flew too directly against the consensus. Furthermore, Block noted that the ‘desire to own is not 
universal.’ Referencing Mass Observation reports conducted during the war, he emphasised that only 
20 per cent of local authority tenants wanted to purchase a house. Furthermore, the varying nature of 
housing estates determined the preference for house purchase, with a survey indicating that only 14 
per cent of tenants on London’s Becontree estate were looking to become owner-occupiers, as 
opposed to the tenants of the ‘more attractive’ Roehampton estate where 29 per cent sought to buy. 
Block was resigned to the notion that a radical sales proposal could not overcome the seemingly 
perpetual expansion of council-housing.35 This contrast in attitudes between Gammans and Block is a 
mirror of the wider division that has been identified by Harriet Jones between the Tory ‘right’, which 
aggressively sought to revive the property market and vastly expand private ownership, and the 
moderate voices of the CRD during the late 1940s.36 
 
The Party formally agreed that ‘no prescriptive right to purchase could be conferred on tenants of 
long standing’ during a November meeting of the Housing Policy Committee (HPC) (Gammans was 
a member and Block was Acting-Secretary).37 Yet it was agreed that ‘local authorities should not be 
hindered from selling houses in accordance with Section 79 of the Housing Act.’38 A report published 
by the committee argued that local authorities should be allowed to use their existing powers to 
dispose of houses ‘surplus to the number required for families unable to afford any economic rent’ – 
a policy codified in August 1952 when Harold Macmillan, as Minister for Housing Local 
Government, issued a ‘general consent’ (Circular 64/62) for council house sales which ended Bevan’s 
official resistance. The circular provided guidelines for how sales would take place and scrapped the 
requirement that local authorities had to obtain the highest possible price. However, the concern not 
to undermine the duty of councils to continue to meet social need ensured that they were encouraged 
 to control re-sale prices and obtain a right of pre-emption within five years of purchase which would 
limit any loss of the council housing stock.39 A reflection of Macmillan’s conciliatory approach, this 
was a moderate attempt to find a middle-way between the desire to encourage owner-occupation and 
to maintain respect for the accepted boundaries of housing governance.40 
 
Throughout the 1950s the Tory elite remained firmly committed to a limited, permissive policy. As 
Housing Minister Macmillan personally devoted little time to the issue, and appears to have been 
largely indifferent towards sales – despite his firm commitment to expanding owner-occupation. His 
apathetic stance was embedded in a wider belief that sales lacked the capacity to significantly increase 
home ownership, and could only make ‘a minor contribution’ to the property-owning cause.41 The 
timidity of the permissive policy was justified by the seemingly obvious lack of public interest, with 
Macmillan describing the number of actual sales completed by March 1953 as ‘negligible.’42 In 
February 1958, the recently appointed Housing minister, Henry Brooke, continued to cite ‘a 
reluctance among council tenants’ to buy.43 Using data obtained from the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government, John Udal at the CRD explained that –  
 
…about two-thirds of all local authorities have expressed their willingness to sell council houses. As 
against this fact that only 10500 sales have been made by some 440 local authorities suggests strongly 
that the disappointingly small number of sales is due not to unwillingness to sell on the part of local 
authorities but to lack of interest on the part of tenants.44 
 
The local government sub-committee was agreed, stating that though the sale of council houses was 
useful it could ‘at best…only be a sideline’ measure in the quest to grow owner-occupation.45 There 
were evidently more fruitful means of expanding home ownership, mainly by encouraging private 
enterprise house building.46  
 
This passivity did not satisfy a number of proactive backbench MPs who were committed to a more 
aggressive sales policy which could circumvent the limitations imposed by reluctant local authorities. 
In 1952 the Conservative MP for Woolwich West, Bill A. Steward, wrote to Macmillan’s private 
secretary, Ernest Marples, to inquire whether the government could overcome local authority 
reluctance.47 Marples response was direct – ‘The short answer to your question is “No”!’48 
 
His reply reiterated the government’s commitment to the prerogative of local authorities.  Marples 
criticised the notion that Whitehall should attempt to encourage sales, stressing that the pressure to 
 buy council properties must come from the local electorate. Steward was left to protest that his own 
local authority, the Labour-led Woolwich Borough Council, was preventing the expansion of home 
ownership for political purposes. He denigrated the ‘soulless body’ of local councils whose monopoly 
over housing deprived the individual of his rights, and urged radical government action.49 Marples 
thought this was ‘rather unfair to the local authorities.’50 When the Staffordshire MP Hugh Fraser 
contacted Marples in November of the same year he was given a similar response – ‘The powers in 
the Housing Acts are permissive, not mandatory… There is little more we can do.’51 
 
This resistance held in the face of a concerted effort by activists through the decade. At a meeting of 
the HLGW committee in July 1959, Harold Gurden, the MP for Birmingham Selly Oak, urged the 
government to encourage local authorities to sell their housing to existing tenants on the grounds that 
there was apparently no further land available for private enterprise building.52 Three months later, 
another backbench MP, Malcolm McClaren, contacted John Udal to inquire as to ‘whether it would 
be a good plan and practical policy to try and give a council tenant…some kind of statutory right to 
buy.’ On 11 November 1959, Gurden opened the committee meeting by expressing deep concern 
over the significant size of local authority tenure, citing the fact that 75 per cent of all homes in 
Birmingham were owned by the council.53 The remedy for this affront should be the mass disposal of 
council houses. Alongside McClaren, Leslie Seymour, Capt. Frederick Corfield, William Clark, and 
Raymond Grener, the Birmingham MP called for the government to compel local authorities to offer 
their council houses for sale. These individuals felt that permissive legislation had failed due to the 
‘vested interests’ of Socialist councils. Compulsion was the only logical solution. Yet resistance to 
such radicalism was strong, and a majority of the committee members criticised of the idea. Phillip 
Hocking argued that, from his experience in Coventry, tenants were ‘evidently reluctant to buy.’ Wilf 
Proudfoot, an ex-member of Scarborough Town Council, explained that since 1952 the council had 
only managed to sell twenty houses despite its willingness to sell. Bourne Acton ‘deprecated the idea 
that Parliament should become the housing authority for the country.’ He was supported by John 
Ellis Talbot who felt that compulsion would irritate Conservative councils, as well as reducing the 
pool of available housing for re-letting. Enoch Powell, the ex-junior housing minister and long-term 
committee member, had the final word on the issue. While sharing the concerns of the claimants over 
the amount of land owned by local authorities, he dismissed the proposals, claiming that ‘the 
committee would be deceiving itself if it thought the enfranchisement of council tenants offered a real 
solution to the problem.’54 Powell’s position mirrored the view of the Party’s policy elite, and though 
Gurden et al. had tried to force the issue, they continued to face the barriers of practicality and 
feasibility. When Henry Brooke and his PPS Keith Joseph visited the committee a year later they 
 reiterated the argument that ‘the man wishing to buy his own house did not want to own a council 
house, but rather a privately built one.’55 
 
Following the end of the war, the Conservative Party had forged a distinctive commitment to the 
extension of private home ownership. Within this ideological drive for a ‘property-owning democracy’ 
the seeds of an idea emerged which would provide the ever-expanding population of council tenants 
with a right to buy their rented-homes. Heavily promoted by a handful of committed believers the 
policy seemed to be firmly in tune with the principles of the post-war Conservative Party. Yet the 
activists for a right to buy were constantly frustrated in attempting to implement their policy, with 
senior Conservatives resistant to compulsory sales. The value of challenging the principles of local 
authority control and legislative precedence was limited by a fundamental lack of demand for council 
house purchase, meaning that any attempt to sell council properties on a mass-scale would expend 
political energy that offered little electoral reward.  
 
III 
In the wake of Labour’s national electoral success in 1964, and Tory local election gains in 1966, a 
number of Conservative controlled local authorities began to undertake large-scale programmes of 
council house sales under the existing general consent. The most high-profile of these schemes was 
that which was pioneered by Birmingham City Council under the leadership of Alderman Frank 
Griffin.56 On winning control of the council in 1966 the local Conservatives combined an intensive 
public promotion of sales, with an offer of discounts for longstanding tenants, and an increase in 
council rents which made mortgage repayments more attractive. By February 1967 the council 
announced that it had sold 2,558 houses over a nine month period.57 The Conservative-led Greater 
London Authority, with Horace Cutler as its Deputy Leader, also campaigned for a mass sale of 
properties, as did the newly-elected Tory council in Manchester.58 
 
The sales activism of Tory councils had a significant impact on public and political discourse which 
placed the Labour government in a difficult position. Though not as ideologically entrenched as 
within the Conservative Party, Labour had never been fully averse to owner-occupation, and 
increasingly championed the expansion of home-ownership alongside council provision during the 
1950s and 1960s.59 Local Labour councils often acted as major providers of mortgage finance – for 
example between 1960 and 1965 Sheffield council provided over 10,000 loans.60 Forrest and Murie 
have argued that it is ‘difficult to sustain the view that the parties’ attitudes to owner occupation 
differed in principle’ – the 1959 Labour manifesto even promised sitting tenants first right of 
 purchase on their council property.61 However, in the late-1960s Anthony Greenwood, the Minister 
for Housing and Local Government, was anxious to maintain the housing stock in order to meet the 
needs of those on council house waiting lists and argued that the mass disposal schemes being 
practiced by Tory councils were irresponsible. He, with the support of the Party conference, argued 
that such schemes would reduce the pool of housing available to let at affordable rents.62 In 1966 it 
was a potent argument given that concerns for housing shortage and homelessness had recently 
derailed the Conservative liberalizing reforms.63 Despite the later efforts of some (notably Wilson’s 
special advisor, Joe Haines, who argued for a sales policy in 1974) the argument against indiscriminate 
sales was officially propounded by Labour throughout the 1970s – culminating in its opposition to the 
1980 legislation.64  
 
Greenwood’s threats to limit sales were a challenge to the freedom of Conservative councils. The 
minister’s resistance seemed to embody the ‘Bevanite’ notion of prioritizing housing need which 
provoked the Conservative Party to reaffirm and restate its commitment to the principles of widening 
home-ownership through council house sales. Geoffrey Rippon, the opposition spokesman on 
housing, led the defense of council house sales in the face of Greenwood’s attack. Buoyed by the 
success of the local schemes which had seen council house sales increase from an average of 2,361 
p.a. in the years 1960-1965, to 3,798 in 1966 alone, Rippon told the Bexley Conservative Association 
that ‘if Mr. Greenwood… restricts the freedom of local authorities and the freedom of choice for 
tenants, I can promise him that he’ll have a major row on his hands.’65 This rebuttal of the threat to 
the general consent developed into a major public debate over the following week, with The Times 
reporting that ‘the sale of council houses appears to be growing into an important political issue.’66 
Even Edward Heath was drawn into the debate, reiterating Rippon’s criticism of Labour ‘doctrine and 
dogma’, and publically supporting Birmingham’s ‘well-planned initiative.’67 
 
During the early months of 1967 Conservative Central Office (CCO) expended significant political 
energy on the issue of council house sales. The Party Chairman, Edward Du Cann, conducted a 
national campaign on the issue, publically arguing that sales did not diminish the housing stock –  as 
Greenwood had suggested – but that the policy of Birmingham City Council was apparently ‘one of 
those rare occasions where an initiative is good for everybody and bad for nobody.’68 It was forcefully 
argued in a CCO memorandum sent to senior Party figures that it was vital to publicize sales ‘as 
fiercely as possible’ as a means of forcing a widespread abstention of the Labour vote in the 
upcoming local elections.69 In response, a leaflet outlining the party’s plan for the sale of council 
houses was distributed to all local parties to help them fight their upcoming campaigns.70 CCO 
 planned press conferences in ‘the major cities’ which were designed to ‘give the impression of a 
“spontaneous” upsurge of feeling’ against any limits imposed by Greenwood, and supportive articles 
were arranged to be published in newspapers and on television.71 CCO and the Party leadership 
sought, in response to regional success, to take the issue of localized council house sales to a national 
level, as it became ‘the most important initiative’ in the forthcoming local elections.72 
 
The first quarter of 1967 witnessed a critical moment in the evolution of the Conservative attitude 
and approach to selling council houses. The significant successes of Tory councils highlighted to the 
Party elite that council house tenants were increasingly willing to purchase their homes in response to 
pro-active measures. Where the Party discourse on sales during the 1950s had been constrained by the 
limited extent to which an active sales policy could have any significant impact on a disinterested 
electorate, the successful implementation of such schemes at the local level vividly highlighted new 
possibilities. This happened to coincide with a shift in the demographic and ideological make-up of 
the Tory Party, in which the patrician and conciliatory figures that had dominated the immediate post-
war decades were gradually replaced with a younger generation of middle-class Tories more willing to 
challenge the perceived status-quo of ‘middle-way’ policies.73 
 
As sales began to increase the attempted limitations of the Labour government pushed the 
Conservatives towards a stronger affirmation of its belief in the principle of encouraging tenants to 
purchase their own homes. When Greenwood strictly limited the number of houses councils could 
sell in 1968 (in Greater London, the west Midlands, south-east Lancashire, and Merseyside, sales were 
limited to 0.25 per cent of the housing stock in a single year) the Conservative response was to argue 
forcefully for the re-implementation of the general consent.74 This mirrored Tory frustrations at 
Bevan’s restrictive policies imposed during the 1940s. Once re-elected in 1970, the Heath 
Government reinstated the freedom sell properties at up to a twenty percent discount, leading to a 
peak of 45,000 sales in 1972 alone (Figure 1). Efforts to shift public housing into private hands – a 
policy which was once the preserve of an ideologically committed few within the party – were no 
longer seen as ineffectual. Where once the idea of mass sales had been ignored, it was now an 
extremely attractive and valuable endeavor worthy of investing political capital. 
  
 
To understand this change it is necessary to look beyond the simple political conflict, and to 
acknowledge the fundamental structural changes within the British housing market which had taken 
place over the prior decades. These changes created the conditions in which the policy idea of a mass 
sale could be liberated and acquire political potency. While the vast expansion of public housing was a 
striking feature of post-war Britain, the dominant trend which characterized this period was the steady 
expansion of owner-occupation (Figure 2). Between 1950 and 1970 the percentage stock of dwelling 
of this tenurial type increased from 29 per cent to 50 per cent (local authority and new town rentals 
increased from 18 per cent to 30 per cent).75 This was primarily driven by dwellings being taken out of 
the private rental sector and placed into the hands of owner-occupiers in what Harold Carter has 
described as ‘a largely un-noticed tenurial revolution.’76 This increase in owner-occupation is notable 
for its changing class incidence – namely the way in which home-ownership percolated down from a 
primarily middle-class preference, to something sought by skilled and semi-skilled working class 
households.77 Rising house prices throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, coupled with inflation 
amenable to mortgage borrowers, made owner-occupation an attractive prospect to those working-
class households increasingly able to afford it.78 This was encouraged further by tax reliefs on 
mortgage interest and imputed income from property, an option mortgage scheme for low income 
owner-occupiers, and exemption from capital gains tax on house sales which privileged property 
 investment.79 Meanwhile, the pursuit of ‘realistic rent policies’ after the mid-1950s, which had sought 
to encourage local authorities to raise housing costs for those local authority tenants most able to pay, 
encouraged affluent working class households to become owner-occupiers.80 By 1972, almost half of 
all skilled working-class households owned their own home.81 
 
 
The effect of expanding home-ownership at the expense of the private rental market had a variety of 
effects. As the skilled-working class sought to leave council provision, or were encouraged to do so by 
their local authority, public housing fundamentally changed in character and purpose.82 No longer was 
it the preserve of ‘respectable’ working-class families, it developed into an increasingly residual form 
of tenure which met the needs of poorer families displaced by the increased pace of slum clearance 
during the 1960s.83 This undermined the support-base for council housing and drove a demand for 
greater housing market flexibility.84 Simultaneously, the quality of new council housing was perceived 
to be in decline. The systems-built, high-rise efforts which dominated much of the 1960s were often 
characterized by failure (e.g. the redevelopment of Hulme in Manchester) which undermined the 
desirability of council renting.85 Culturally, the idea of an archetypal council house and tenant shifted 
from high-quality and ‘respectable’, to low-quality and poor. Alison Ravetz has noted that in the 
fifteen years preceding 1970 existing tenants had also been required to subsidize new construction as 
council rents had risen by 85-90 per cent in real terms and outstripped earnings increases.86 In 
comparison, mortgage repayments became increasingly attractive, especially when offered by 
supportive local authorities. By the start of the 1970s the private rental sector, which had ceded so 
 much of its share of the housing stock to new owner-occupiers had largely been exhausted as a source 
of property purchase. Demand for home ownership continued to grow for the working-class families 
who could afford to buy, and so purchasing existing council properties became a more practical 
option.  
 
The success of Tory-council campaigns were the catalyst in persuading the national Conservative 
Party to take a more pro-active and aggressive stance in support of sales. Local successes were, 
however, embedded in these wider socio-economic and tenurial changes. As council-tenants either did 
not have the capacity, desire, or need to purchase their homes from the local authority during the 
1950s it was not a viable option to vigorously push for sales. Yet as expanding working-class owner-
occupation came into conflict with the constraints and changing character of the UK housing market 
at the end of the 1960s, the increased willingness of tenants to buy ensured that council-house sales 
became a politically valuable issue for the Tories. 
 
IV 
Having removed the obstacle of central government limitations on local authority discretion, the 
focus of those concerned to increase sales shifted to reluctant councils. As had occurred during the 
1950s, it became increasingly evident that significant limitations on the ability of tenants to purchase 
their house were perpetuated by unenthusiastic councils. However, where those who had supported 
the idea of compelling local authorities to sell were constrained during the 1950s, the recently 
affirmed Conservative commitment to encouraging sales in an environment of greater demand 
enabled the supporters of compulsion to gain an increased influence over the policy debate. This 
campaign was emboldened by a groundswell of tenant anger against Labour restrictions. For example, 
Peter Shapely notes that when the Labour Party was re-elected to lead Manchester council in 1971, 
and the sale of council houses was stopped, tenants formed the ‘Council House Buyers Association’ 
and campaigned vigorously for a reinstatement of their right to buy.87  
 
A key figure in the campaign to compel local authorities to sell their council homes was Harold 
Gurden. The Birmingham MP had tried to persuade the Conservative Government to provide all 
tenants with a right of purchase during the late 1950s, only to be rebuked by an unconvinced Party 
elite. During the 1960s Gurden was to become one of the first Conservative MPs to join The Monday 
Club – a right-wing group borne out of distaste for the moderation of the Macmillan government, and 
one which was to publish a paper in 1966 arguing that by compelling councils to sell their housing 
stock the Conservatives could destroy British socialism.88 By the early 1970s Gurden’s commitment to 
 the widespread sale of council houses had not faded, and in January 1972 he tabled a Private 
Members Bill in Parliament which proposed ‘to extend to the tenants of dwellings owned by local 
authorities and other housing bodies the right to acquire the ownership or leasehold of their home.’89 
In presenting the bill to the Commons, Gurden described it as seeking to ‘“denationalize” family 
homes.’ He expressed frustration that while some local authorities unenthusiastically undertook sales, 
many refused to do so at all. Gurden argued that sales could be justified on the grounds that by 
buying their homes working-class families would be able to insure themselves against rising rents; the 
‘pride of ownership’ could overcome urban deterioration; and private ownership would increase 
labour mobility.90 
 
Where Gurden had previously remained on the fringes of the Party’s housing discourse, his push for 
compulsion had significant influence in 1972. In April, Walter Ulrich, under-Secretary to Peter Walker 
at the Department of the Environment, wrote a note which described the ‘mounting pressure for 
something further to be done by the Government to stimulate council house sales.’ Ulrich noted that 
there had been a marked increase in ‘Ministerial and official correspondence emanating from tenants 
wishing to buy.’ While Ulrich was unable to accurately say how many people would willingly buy their 
homes, he was confident that the potential was considerable given that a 1968 survey had indicated 
that some 400,000 tenants were in a position to buy on the private market.91 Compulsion had become 
an increasingly attractive policy option, and where Gurden had only managed to gain the support of 
like-minded backbenchers in 1959, by 1972 his influence on policy formation was significant – even 
garnering the support of ‘consensual’ Tory grandees such as Quintin Hogg.92 
 
Following the advice provided by Ulrich, Walker took the case for more pro-active sales policy to the 
Cabinet, citing the significant recent growth in council house purchases and the ongoing reluctance of 
many councils (‘not all of them Labour controlled’) to sell. Walker argued that demand for purchase 
was likely to increase, especially after the rent increases in the upcoming Housing Finance Bill which 
were to shift housing subsidies from more affluent council tenants to poorer tenants in both the 
public and private sector.93 However if this demand for owner-occupation was to move into the 
existing private market it would push up house prices. Therefore, increased council-house sales would 
serve ‘to bring supply more quickly into line with demand.’ Yet to ‘curtail the freedom of local 
authorities’ would antagonize councils at a time in which Walker was simultaneously attempting to 
implement the Housing Finance Bill and a Local Government Bill.94 The latter was a radical 
reorganisation of the structure of local government which abolished many small and historic local 
authorities in the name of rationalization and efficiency.95 The Cabinet noted that measures of 
 compulsion would arouse ‘considerable resentment’ at a time in which the co-operation of local 
government was needed, and so the Prime Minister decided that the furthest extent of possible action 
at that time would be to issue ‘a strongly worded circular’ in an attempt to encourage more sales.96 
However, in planning for the 1974 election the Party resolved to promise to provide all council 
tenants with a right to buy on re-election. As a member of the housing policy manifesto group Clive 
Landa, the Greater London area Young Conservatives Chairman, stressed the need to ‘“shake out” 
some of the large council estates,’ and John Stanley of the CRD expressed the view that the Labour 
Party had ‘statutorily prevented sales’ and therefore the Conservative Party should do the opposite. 
Though some members of the policy-group remained concerned about the wisdom of imposing such 
a policy on local authorities, their worries were now marginalised.97 On 18 January 1974, in the second 
contingency manifesto draft, the policy of compulsion was first included. Referring to the restrictions 
of Labour councils to sales, the draft stated that: 
 
To overcome this obstacle we shall ensure that, in future, council tenants are able, as of right, to buy 
on reasonable terms the house or flat in which they live.98 
 
Despite opposition from the Prime Minister’s political secretary, Douglas Hurd, who felt that the 
scheme was of ‘doubtful political value,’ the statutory right of purchase made its way into the final 
draft of the manifesto.99 The idea of forcing local authorities to sell their properties, which had been 
resisted just over a decade earlier, was now acceptable and attractive to the Conservative Cabinet. The 
parameters of consensus (in this case local authority prerogative and concern not to erode the stock 
of council houses) had faded rapidly once a new set of electoral possibilities had emerged. If not for 
the contingencies of governance, specifically the desire to not cause frictions which might de-rail the 
government’s established legislative programme, a ‘right to buy’ policy may have been implemented as 
early as 1972.  
 
It is also important to note the broader change in the attitude of the Tory leadership to local 
government at this time. Ken Young has argued that in the immediate post-war decades the Party had 
valued, and politically dominated, the institutions of local governance. Many senior Tories (e.g. Henry 
Brooke) had extensive experience of local politics and accepted its structure and relationship with 
Whitehall as fixed. Yet in the decade between abolition of the London authorities in 1963 (which had 
led to the creation of the Greater London Council as an attempt to both improve Conservative 
electoral fortunes and administration in the capital) and the Local Government Act in 1972, ‘the 
balance between central control and local autonomy was ruptured’.100 Contemporary ideals of 
 ‘modernisation’ and ‘rationalisation’ were the driving force behind Walker’s radical reforms in 1972, in 
which hundreds of small district authorities were merged. The Heath government was clearly far less 
deferential to the established autonomy and institutional norms of local government than its 1950s 
predecessors, and thus the idea of imposing sales on local authorities was likely deemed less radical in 
this context.101  
 
Following the loss of the February election, the responsibility for formulating the Party’s housing 
policy fell to a policy group under the leadership of the newly appointed Shadow Environment 
Secretary – Margaret Thatcher. Encouraged by the re-imposition of Labour restrictions which had 
reduced the number of sales dramatically, this group did not challenge the notion of a right to buy, 
instead focusing its energies on determining how to value council properties, and debating the size of 
discounts which could be offered.102 When the group presented its findings to in late July Peter 
Walker spoke strongly in favour of cheaply selling council properties as an ‘imaginative’ policy which 
might win over a million Labour votes. However, there was a concern within the committee that a 
cheap divesture of houses might anger existing homeowners who had paid full price for their 
properties. Furthermore, if council houses were disposed of too cheaply there was a danger that 
private owners on nearby estates ‘might lose on the capital value’ of their homes. Thatcher expressed 
trepidation that highly-discounted council house sales would endanger the Party’s traditional vote – 
‘our people.’103 This concern constrained the idea of a large discount, and though the manifesto for 
the October election was to stress more vigorously the Party’s commitment to a statutory right of 
purchase in the face of ‘partisan’ councils, the manifesto promised a discount of no more than one 
third.104 
 
V 
By the end of 1974 the commitment to a statutory ‘right to buy’ was firmly established as a 
Conservative Party policy. In the following years it gained a new impetus as it became co-opted into a 
broader Tory emphasis on the need to significantly reducing public expenditure. Concerns for the 
increasing cost of council-house construction, upkeep, and subsidies was not entirely new. The Heath 
Tory Government had attempted to cut housing costs in the 1972 Housing Finance Act by placing 
council rents on a ‘free-market basis’ and abandoning subsidies for ‘affluent’ tenants. It was intended 
that this rent-increase would encourage tenants to become home-owners by making mortgages more 
attractive.105 However, with the onset of economic turmoil of the mid-1970s and the rapid increase in 
the public sector borrowing requirement, the need for reductions in public expenditure became more 
pressing.106  
  
At the first meeting of a newly formed ‘Home Ownership and Construction Industry Policy Group’ 
(HCPG) in June 1975 it was agreed that the cost of new council home provision was becoming 
‘increasingly prohibitive.’ The extension of home ownership was a solution to this problem as owner-
occupiers were ‘prepared to devote a larger proportion of their income to housing than council 
tenants.’107 In a draft report the group emphasised that permanent subsidies for new council houses 
were more expensive than tax relief on mortgage interest.108 In October 1975, the ex-Environment 
Minister Peter Walker, published an appeal for the mass disposal of council properties. Writing in the 
Municipal Journal, Walker suggested a radical idea which went much further than had been previously 
proposed – to give long-standing tenants their council homes.109 The MP for Worcester, who had co-
founded the well-known financial firm Slater Walker in 1964, argued his case in almost purely financial 
terms. He stated that the cost of supervision, management, repairs and maintenance of council 
properties equalled £427 million per year. If, he explained, every council tenant was given their home, 
the cost to the government would be a mere £172 million – ‘less than one-quarter of the cost of the 
increase in local government salaries’ likely to take place that year. The existing system, he argued, 
created ‘a continuous burden of high taxes and rates upon existing owner-occupiers.’ When invited to 
the HCPG in March 1976, Walker was congratulated on the way in which his proposed scheme was 
able to overcome local council opposition and ‘officially inspired bureaucratic details’ – yet the group 
felt that the response of existing home owners would make the scheme politically impossible.110 A 
‘Housing Finance Policy Group’ (HFPG) under the leadership of the Party’s Environment 
spokesman, Timothy Raison, also agreed that Walker’s scheme was too radical. However, the 
underlying principles which guided both groups’ attitudes to sales were highly influenced by the desire 
to undertake ‘a significant reduction in public expenditure on housing.’ That is not to say that the 
ideas of expanding property ownership did not remain core to Conservative thinking (the HFG report 
referred to the scheme as achieving an irreversible ‘massive transfer of power and wealth’ from the 
State to the individual, likened to Henry VIII’s monastic land dispersals) – it was merely given a new 
financial impetus.111  
 
Nigel Lawson, in a paper for the ‘Public Sector Policy Group’ in March 1976, most cogently 
summarized the changed focus of Conservative housing policy. Noting that in the five years prior to 
1976-77 public expenditure on housing had increased by 107 per cent, Lawson argued that housing 
offered ‘unique scope for really massive public expenditure cuts.’ Housing was a particularly 
convenient target for spending reductions because there was a well-developed private sector 
alternative, and was unlikely to impact on employment. Lawson estimated that gross receipts from 
 sales of over £1,000 million a year.112 A short CRD paper produced by an unnamed author later that 
month insisted that: 
 
Man does not live by public expenditure cuts alone. If we are to put before the public the need to 
restrain Government spending very severely, there is a particular need to relieve the gloom by 
advocating a really aggressive strategy to expand home ownership.113 
  
Against this background, the HFPG and the HCPG focused on shaping the policy specifics which 
were to eventually define the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme. Having rejected the discount of one third which 
had been proposed in 1974 as ‘in no way a bargain’, the HFPG set about attempting to formulate a 
‘simple’ and ‘financially viable’ scheme ‘which did not have a wide differential between rent and 
mortgage repayments.’114 The HCPG produced its final proposals in May 1976, arguing for a third off 
the market price after three years tenancy, with a one per cent increase in discount per year up to a 
maximum of fifty percent.115 This discount structure was accepted as the most effective means of 
encouraging a mass disposal of properties which would not anger existing home-owners, and was 
implemented in the final ‘Right to Buy’ legislation in 1980. When, in June 1978, Michael Heseltine 
(Shadow Industry Secretary, later to become the Environment Secretary) was given the responsibility 
of conducting a ‘National Housing Campaign,’ the principle, purpose, and structure of the ‘Right to 
Buy’ policy had already been fully formed.116 
 
VI 
The idea of a mass sale of council houses was borne out of opposition to the Labour public-
ownership principle that drove housing policy immediately after 1945. The Conservative commitment 
to building a ‘property-owning democracy’ appeared to justify sales, yet the idea of providing a 
statutory right of purchase for sitting tenants at a discount was constrained by an unwillingness to 
challenge the practices of local-authorities due to a lack of public demand. It was not until the late-
1960s that party elites saw the idea of a mass disposal of properties as an attractive and tenable policy 
option. The Tory commitment to providing council-tenants with a right to purchase their home at a 
discount was largely established by 1974, prior to Margaret Thatcher’s leadership election. It gained a 
further impetus after the onset of economic crisis in the mid-1970s as a useful means to reduce public 
expenditure 
 
The ascent of ‘Right to Buy’ was a function of socio-economic changes during the post-war decades 
in which increasingly affluent working-class council-tenants sought to buy their own homes, which in 
 turn undermined the foundations on which the mass provision of council housing was built. These 
social and economic dynamics, operating within the specific context of the British housing market, 
were transmitted through the already existing ideological-preferences and policy ideas of activists 
within the Conservative Party who had sought to radically reduce the size and scope of public housing 
in Britain since the war. The Thatcher government’s break with the principles of post-war municipal 
public housing provision had its intellectual and conceptual roots in the ideals of the post-war 
Conservative housing discourse, yet the adoption of the ‘Right to Buy’ was contingent on the context 
of a changing Britain in the three decades after 1945.  
 
It is therefore reiterated in this article that the notion of Thatcherism as a radical ideological break 
with post-war Conservatism is false and simplistic. Furthermore, it suggests that the post-1979 
Thatcher government inherited a political situation in which the economic and social underpinnings 
of the post-war ‘consensus’ policy norms had melted away, creating the opportunity to pursue 
Conservative ends with a significantly improved chance of political success.  
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